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ABSTRACT 
Crime control thro11gh lmr enforcement is generally considered to be a two-part process of appre­
hending and incapacitating or rehabilitating the gLtilty, and deterring the innocent from crime by the 
ihreat of punishment. The analysis presented here slwws that the protection of the innocent from harass­
ment-detention, arresr. p11nishment, and other inrrusions by the criminal justice system-is important 
in deterring crime. Spec(fically, the analysis shoH·s that deterrence from crime is weakened and then lost 
/or a rational indii·idual ,,·ho holds the majority arritude roward risk, if the levels of rightful punishment 
and -..,,1-rongfLtl harassmem are increased, as in a war 011 crime, and the likelihoods of wrongful and right­
ful pLtnishment are reasonably close. The analysis is employed ro show how the perceived likelihood of 
harassment may be a comributing factor to the disproponionarely high representation of minoriry 
groups in the U.S. prison system. © 1997 Elsevier Science Ltd 
INTRODl7CTION 
This article establishes that, under certain 
conditions, individuals are encouraged to com­
mit crimes by a belief that the criminal justice 
system may act against them whether or not 
they commit crimes. Thus, protection of the in­
nocent from police harassment may itself deter 
crime, and harassment of the innocent by the 
criminal justice system may encourage crime. 
The latter result is used to hypothesize a partial 
explanation of the ethnic demographics of the 
U.S. prison population that is superior to the 
conventional argument that cnminals are invet­
erate risk takers. This explanation is generaliz-
able to cases where members of a particular so­
cial group perceive themselves to be unfairly 
treated by law enforcement agents. 
The criminal justice system is considered to 
help control crime because the likelihood of be­
ing apprehended and punished deters persons 
from committing crimes. Additionally, by the 
apprehension, conviction, and punishment of 
persons who have committed crimes, the sys­
tem incapacitates and, with any luck, rehabili­
tates criminals. Only deterrence, and not inca­
pacitation or rehabilitation, is examined in this 
article. 
One side effect of the criminal justice system 
is the potential for harassment, apprehension, 
3-·r_) 
and punishment of persons who have not com­
mitted crimes, or at least have not committed 
the crimes for which they are being investi­
gated, apprehended, or charged. A simple ratio­
nal actor model, an extension of the traditional 
economic model of Becker ( 1968, 1995), estab­
lishes the following result: For the majority of 
individuals, a belief that the likelihood of ha­
rassment is not reasonably lower than the likeli­
hood of proper punishment encourages the 
commission of crimes. 
DECISION ANALYSIS A.l'-l"D ATTITUDE 
TOWARD RISK 
The analysis presented here is an extension 
and refinement of the rational actor model em­
ployed in the economic and game-theoretic 
analyses of the decision to commit a crime. The 
present analysis extends these analyses of crime 
by including a more contemporary treatment of 
attitude toward risk and the costs imposed on 
nonparticipants in crime by the criminal justice 
system. 1 
The rational actor model characterizes ratio­
nal behavior as svstematic behavior £0\·emed bv . � -
the optimization of expected utility, itself deter-
mined by an individual's evaluation of the pay­
offs and the likelihoods of the payoffs. and the 
individual" s attitude toward risk. (On the ratio­
nal actor model see Bernoulli. 1738; von Neu­
m,mn. and Morgenstern, 1947; Savage. 1954; 
Fishburn. 1970: and Jeffrey 1983. On attitude 
toward risk see Bernoulli, 1738; Pratt. 1964; 
and Arrow. 1965.) The modem account of the 
rational actor model has been greatly informed 
by careful observations of revealed risk atti­
tudes (Fishburn. 1977; Fishburn and Kochen­
berger. 1979; Battalio. Kagel, and MacDonald, 
1985; Battalio, Kagel. and Jiranyakul, 1990.)2
The present analysis employs the modem ac­
count of the rational actor model to provide a 
refined and extended version of the traditional 
economic analysis of crime (Becker, 1968, 1995). 
The discussion presented here is kept consistent 
with the traditional analysis for two reasons. 
First, the traditional analysis serves as the foun­
dation for much of the work in the law and eco­
nomics literature. Second, the results of the tra-
ditional analysis provide a justification for the 
contemporary get-tough-on-crime policies of 
the federal and various state and local govern­
ments in the United States. 
The treatment of attitude toward risk is the 
fundamental refinement of the traditional analy­
sis adopted here. There are three relevant atti­
tudes toward risk: (1) an individual is risk 
averse if, and only if, the individual's utility 
function is increasing at a decreasing rate; (2) 
an individual is risk preferring if, and only if, 
the individual's utility function is increasing at 
an increasing rate; and (3) an individual is risk 
averse/risk preferring if, and only if, the indi­
vidual is risk averse over gains and risk prefer­
ring over losses. Risk aversion is generally 
viewed as the essence of middle-class normalcy, 
while risk preference is viewed as an abnormality. 
Risk aversion and risk preferring behavior 
are regularly seen together, and various at­
tempts have been made to explain their joint ap­
pearance (Battalio, Kagel. and Jiranyakul, 1990: 
Battalio, Kagel, and MacDonald, 1985; Cam­
erer, 1989; Fishburn, 1977: Fishburn and Kochen­
berger, 1979; Friedman and Savage, 1948). Ob­
servations of revealed attitude toward risk show 
that the majority of individuals are risk averse/ 
risk preferring; that the utility valuation of no 
change in wealth is zero; and that the utility 
function is more steeply sloped over losses than 
over gains (Battalio, Kagel, and Jiranyakul. 
1990; Battalio, Kagel, and MacDonald, 1985; 
Fishburn and Kochenberger. 1979). 
The modern work on risk also shows that 
wealth serves as a parameter in the utility func­
tion, and that the utility function can be viewed 
as a two-dimensional cross-section of a three­
dimensional surface. For example, a two-piece 
von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function that 
exhibits constant absolute risk aversion and 
constant absolute risk preference is of the gen­
eral form: 
-BtJ.wU ( � w) = A ( 1 - e ) for � w :2: 0 
BtJ.w = -a ( 1 - e ) for 6 w � 0 
where A and a are slope parameters, B is the de­
gree of risk version/risk preference, 6.w is 
change in wealth, a > A > 0, and B > 0. 
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This function is an S-shaped utility function 
and is displayed in Figure 1. 
The related von Neumann-Morgenstern util­
ity surface, as a function of change in wealth, 
-6.w, and wealth, w, is of the general form: 
-I · -BD.wU ( 6. w) = w A ( 1 - e ) for 6. w � 0 
-1 B6.w 
= -w a(l-e ) for6.w�0 
Th.is surface is displayed in Figure 2. Note the ef­
fect of increasing wealth in Figure 2-the S-shaped 
utility function, which is a cross-section of the 
surface, flattens as wealth increases. 
THE CRIME DECISION PROBLEM 
The crime decision problem consists of the 
choice between engaging in a particular crimi­
nal act and not engaging in the act. The decision 
is made on the basis of the individual's percep­
tion of the particular crime and the existing 
criminal justice system at the time of the deci­
sion. The decision maker believes that the crime 
-10 -5
U(.0.w) 1 o 
5 
will �ield a gain. If caught and punished, the de­
cision maker believes there will be a loss, 
greater than the gain, imposed by the criminal 
justice system. The individual assesses the 
probability, given that the crime is committed, 
of being punished. The decision not to commit 
the crime does not carry any gain, but may have 
some costs imposed by the criminal justice sys­
tem. For example, an innocent person may be 
stopped for investigation, detained, arrested, 
and perhaps even convicted. The cost thus 
borne is called the harassment cost. The indi­
vidual assesses the size and the probability of 
incurring the harassment costs.3 In a society 
with diYided legislative, judicial, and executive 
powers. the value of the fine is primarily set by 
the decision maker's perception of the law as 
set down in statutes and by the courts. The val­
ues of the harassment cost and the probabilities 
of being punished and being harassed are pri­
marily set by the decision maker" s perception of 
lav.· enforcement policies and practices.4 
Consistent with the rational actor model, the 
indiYidual chooses between the two acts--com-
5 10 
D.W 
Figure 1. Graph of the Constant Absolute Risk A version/Risk Preference von Neumann-Morgen­
stern Utility Function (A = 10, a = 20, B = 0.1). 
--
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Figure 2. Graph of the Constant Absolute Risk A version/Risk Preference von Neumann-Morgen­
stern Utility Surface (A = 10, a = 20. B = 0.1). 
mitting and not committing the crime-by ap­
plying the utility function to the possible out­
comes of the acts, assigning probabilities to the 
possible states of affairs, and determining the 
probability weighted utility, called the expected 
utility, of each act. The act with the greater ex­
pected utility is the preferred act. To avoid trivi­
alities, the present analysis is based on the 
three-part assumption that the gain is positive. 
the fine is greater than the gain, and the gain 
less the fine is more negative than the harass­
ment cost. The first two assumptions avoid situ­
ations where crime does not pay and where 
crime always pays: the last is merely the as­
sumption that the criminal justice system is suf­
ficiently accurate to impose. on average, greater 
costs on criminals who get caught in its web 
than on noncriminals. The analysis begins with 
the presumption that the police are more likely 
to properly intercept the guilty than to improp­
erly intercept the innocent.5
The crime decision problem is presented in 
Table 1. The parameters are as follows-g is 
the gain from the crime. f is the fine, c is the 
harassment cost. p is the probability of rightful 
punishment, and q is the probability of wrongful 
TABLE 1 
PAYOFF TABLE FOR THE CRIME DECISION PROBLEM 
Payoff Payoff 
If Crime Is Probability of If Crime Is Probability of 
Committed Punishment Not Committed Harassment 
Punished or harassed g-f p -c q 
Not punished or not harassed g 1 - p 0 1 - q 
1 
harassment. As noted, to avoid trivialities it is as­
sumed thatf > g > 0, g-f < -c, and p > q.6 
The expected utility of committing the crime is: 
EU[crime] = pU(g-f)+(l-p)U(g),
and the expected utility of not committing the 
crime is 
EU[no crime] = qU(-c) + ( I - q) U(O),
where EU is the individual's expected utility 
function and U(O) = 0. The individual prefers 
committing the crime to not committing the 
crime if. and only if: 
EU[crime] > EU[no crime]. 
For an individual deterred from crime, the 
difference between EU(no crime) and EU(crime)
is positive. The difference. denoted by D, is: 
D = £U(no crime)-£U(crime) 
= q u ( -c) - [p u ( g - f) + (1 - p) u ( g) ] . 
The difference D is a crude measure of deter­
rence because only two values of D are of inter­
est: D > 0 and D < 0. Deterrence is maintained 
for the individual only if D > 0 and is lost if D <
0. A change in one or more of the parameters .
that is. one or more g.f. c, p, or q, such that Dis 
decreased. reduces deterrence because, as 
noted. if continued until D < 0, such a change 
will make participation in the criminal activity 
the pref erred act. 
THE PlJN1SHMENT-DETERRENCE 
TRADEOFF 
The analysis presented here addresses one 
basic question-does a strategy for increasing 
the punishment of the guilty, f, increase deter­
rence if it has the side effect of increasing the 
level of harassment. c, imposed on those inno­
cently caught up in the criminal justice system? 
The answer to this question depends upon the 
individual's attitude toward risk. The answer is 
positive for risk averse and risk neutral persons. 
and positive for risk averse/risk preferring per­
sons as long as the probability of punishment, p.
is reasonably larger than the probability of ha­
rassment, q. The answer. however, is negative 
--
for risk averse/risk preferring persons if q is 
close top. 
The derivation of this result is straightfor­
ward. The response of D to small and equal in­
creases inf and c is given by the total differen­
tial of D, dD. where 
aD an dD = 
cJJ 
df + acd c
= pU'(g-f)df-qU'(-c)dc,
and 
cJD cJD cJJ and cJ c 
are the partial derivatives of D with respect to f
and c, respectively. For a risk averse person, 
U'(g - J) > U'(-c) because g -f < -c and U
is increasing at a decreasing rate. For a risk neu­
tral individual, U'(g - f) = U'(-c). If p > q,
then dD is positive for a risk averse or risk neu­
tral person. and the answer to the question is 
positive. Contrariwise, for a risk preferring or a 
risk averse/risk preferring person. U' (g - f) <
U'(-c), becauseg - J< -c < 0. and Uis in­
creasing at an increasing rate over losses. If p is 
reasonably larger than q, that is. if 
p U'(-c) ->----. q U'(g-f). 
then dD is positive, and the answer to the ques­
tion is positive. Contrariwise. if q is close to p, 
that is, if 
p U'(-c) 
q < U'(g-f)'
then dD is negative, and the answer to the ques­
tion is negative.7
The foregoing results warrant the following 
claims. A policy of increasingly severe punish­
ment of both the guilty and the innocent should 
be a successful deterrent for those individuals,. 
regardless of their attitudes toward risk, who · 
perceive the likelihood of punishment to be rea­
sonably greater than the likelihood of harass­
ment. Such a policy, however, will not be a suc­
cessful deterrent for individuals who are risk 
preferring or risk averse/risk preferring if they 
perceive that the likelihood of harassment is 
close to or greater than the likelihood of punish-
Crime Control 
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ment. Note that the deterrent effect of increas-
ingly severe punishment and harassment de-
pends upon both the decision maker's attitude 
coward risk and his or her perception of the like-
lihoods of punishment and harassment. Finally, 
note that the foregoing analysis concerns only 
the individual's movement toward committing 
the crime. The individual chooses to commit the 
crime if and only if D < 0, that is, if and only if. 
! U( a) - U(-c) p q O . 
-<~-----q U(g)-U(g-f) 
Because 
1 
-U(o)>U(o) q O 0 
and 
U(g- f) < U(-c ), 
the right-hand side of this inequality does nm: 
have a unique relationship co unity. Therefore. q 
need not exceed p in order for committing the 
crime to be the preferred act. 
RISK A TTITL'DE. HARASSMENT, AND 
U.S . PRISON DEMOGRAPHICS 
The policy implications of the foregoing 
analysis are straightforward. iuiy policy that in-
creases the severity of both the punishment of 
the guilty and the harassment of the innocent. 
such as a war on crime. may tend to induce 
criminal behavior among those who are risk 
averse/risk preferring and perceive similar like-
lihoods of being rightfully punished or wrong-
fully harassed. The traditional economic analy-
sis of crime explains criminal activity by ' 
positing that most criminals are inveterate risk 
takes, that is. habirually risk preferring over 
both loses and gains.8 This explanation, al-
though consistent with the analysis presented 
here , has two glaring weaknesses. First, risk 
preference over gains is rare (Fishburn and 
Kochenberger. 1979) and criminal activity is 
not. Second. because a disproportionate number 
of criminals in the U.S. prison system come 
fro~ minority groups. the traditional explana-
tion requires the presumption that dispropor-
--
tionately many members of minorities are risk 
preferring over gains. (See, generally, Horney 
and Marshall, 1992; Katz, 1991; Keane, Gilli, 
and Hagan, 1989; Rand, 1992; Sherman, 1990; 
U.S. Department of Justice, 1991; Williams and 
Hawkins, 1986; Yu and Liska, 1993; Zimring 
and Hawkins, 1973.) 
The analysis advanced here presents the the-
oretical basis for a possibly superior (partial) 
explanation of the demographics of the Ameri-
can prison population. The explanation prof-
fered here makes two simple presumptions. 
First, it is presumed that minority populations 
have the same distribution of attirudes toward 
risk as the general population. Second, it is pre-
sumed that many minority individuals see them-
selves as regular recipients of harassment, and 
thereby perceive the probability of harassment 
as close to, or even greater than. the probability 
of rightful punishment.9 This perception, and 
not some odd concentration of a rare attitude to-
ward risk. explains some. but not all, of the dis-
proportionate number of African American, Na-
tive American, and Latino prisoners in the U.S. 
penal system. 
~ore that a claim is not made here that the 
foregoing argument explains the whole of U.S. 
prison demographics. The literarure on the 
causes of crime offers many potential causes, 
including poverty, opporcunity. and risk prefer-
ence. Members of minorities are disproportion-
ately well represented among the poor, and they 
may have greater opporcunities for crime. It is 
not likely, however, that they disproportionately 
possess a rare attitude toward risk. The forego-
ing argument, based only on the presumption 
that minority individuals perceive a probability 
of harassment that is close to the probability of 
punishment, thus provides a superior explana-
tion of some of the disproportionate minority 
representation in the U.S. prison system. 
ASPECTS OF FAIR.J.'iESS IN 
CRilvIIN AL JUSTICE 
In an ideal society both q and c would be 
very close to zero. In such a society, a law abid-
ing citizen would have a very low likelihood of 
contact with the police or the legal system, and 
Crime Control 331 
any contact that did occur would be at most a 
minor inconvenience. This property of an ideal 
society is one of the many facets of the notion 
of fairness. 
Most accounts of societal fairness are related 
to wealth or income distribution. Bueno de 
Mesquita and Cohen !1995) provides a game­
theoretic model of criminal choice in which 
fairness is introduced as wealth redistribution. 
Specifically, the goYernmem is fair (or trust­
worthy) if it imposes .. policies that promote op­
portunities for the citizens ... and it is unfair (or 
untrustworthy) if it imposes "·policies that shift 
resources to the goYernmem to be used as the 
government sees fit .. (Bueno de Mesquita and 
Cohen, 1995:494). Similariy. Young (1994) pro­
vides an extensive formal treatment of fairness 
as equity. On this ,·iew. a society is fair if "the 
division of jointly produced goods [is made in a 
way that the] society considers ro be appropriate 
to the need, status. and contribution of its vari­
ous members" (Youn£:. 1994:3 ). 
The notion of fairness employed in the 
present article has a muc:1 more limited scope 
and focuses on the implementation of the proce­
dures. rules, and laws of the legal system. In 
this view, the legal system is fair to an individ­
ual facing the crime decision problem only if 
the probability of punishment, p, is reasonabiy 
larger than the probability of harassment, q, and 
the harassment cost. c. is close to zero. The le­
gal system is unfair if q is dose top, or c is rea­
sonably larger than zero. or both. 
The results deri\·ed above can be restated in 
terms of the (limited) notion of fairness. If the 
legal system is unfair in the strong form of the 
sense employed here (i.e .. if q is close top and c 
is greater than zeroJ. then the individual moves 
toward and ultimately chooses the criminal act. 
Given the general perception that the legal sys­
tem is unfair, in the sense used here, particularly 
to African Americans. � ative Americans, and 
Latinos, it is not surprising that members of 
these minorities are disproportionately well rep­
resented in the American penal system. 
The notion of fairness as equitable wealth 
distribution can be accounted for here by con­
sidering different wealth levels of the decision 
maker. The effect of wealth on the S-shaped 
utility function was detailed above-the utility 
--
surface flattens as wealth increases. Thus, those 
individuals who are treated unfairly with re­
spect to wealth distribution will have more ec­
centric utility functions than those who are 
treated fairly. A formal analysis of this effect is 
beyond the scope of the present articl�. Note, 
howeYer. that because an S-shaped utility func­
tion is more steeply sloped on the loss side, the 
effect of greater eccentricity is to give greater 
weight to the risk preferring segment of the util­
ity function. Thus, in general, unfairness with 
respect to wealth will lead ro greater levels of 
criminal activity in the present model. In partic­
ular, it is easy to show that for an individual fac­
ing giYen values of the parameters g,f, c, p, and 
q, it is not possible to have crime preferred to no 
crime at a high wealth level and no crime pre­
f erred to crime at a low wealth level. 
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NOTES 
1. On the economic analysis of rhe crime decision see.
panicularly. Becker (1968. 1995'1 and. generally, Ehrlich 
and Becker (1972), Ehrlich (1973). Block and Reineke 
(19751. and Posner (1980). On rhe game-theoretic analysis 
see Bueno de Mesquita and Cohen ( 19951. The traditional 
economic analysis. panicularly Becker ( 1968), considers al­
tematiYe risk attitudes. but does not consider either the risk 
averseirisk preferring attitude or harassment. The Bueno de 
Mesquita-Cohen (1995) analysis assumes that the decision 
maker is risk neutral. and also does not consider harass­
ment. The former point is clear from the calculation of the 
expected utility for a criminal (Bueno de Mesquita and Co­
hen. 1995:497). This calculation is linear in payoffs and 
thereby presumes a linear (i.e .. risk neutral) utility function. 
The latter point is made by Bueno de Mesquita and Cohen 
as follows: "To keep our analysis as simple as possible at 
this stage in our research, we assume that no one is mistak­
enly arrested and convicted. and we assume that everyone 
who is apprehended is guilty and conYicted" (Bueno de . 
Mesquita and Cohen, 1995:497. footnote 8). 
2. Parallel work is presented in Kahneman and Tversky
(I 979) and Tversky and Kahneman (1992). Please note that 
these studies present and refine Prospect Theory, which is 
not consistent with the expected utility theory employed in 
Becker (1968, 1995), Bueno de Mesquita and Cohen (1995). 
and in the present anicle. 
3. See Homey and Marshall (1992) for evidence that
among criminals these perceptions are formed in a manner 
consistent with the rational actor model. See Yu and Liska 
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( 1993) on the perception of the likelihood of punishment in 
a study disaggregated by race. 
4. The present analysis takes a middle path in defining 
the costs of involvement with the criminal justice system. 
and falls between the official criminal sanction ( the sen-
tence only) and all conceivable costs (such as humiliation in 
the community). The latter are described as informal sanc-
tions in an expanded concept of deterrence in Nagin and Pa-
ternoster (1991). Property forfeiture by the innocent. which 
has become increasingly common in the United States. is 
treated by Jensen and Gerber (1996). 
5. There is one interesting case where the two probabili-
ties are approximately equal-when law enforcement-citi-
zen interactions involve random selection of persons for in-
vestigation. This would be the case where drunk driving is 
detected primarily through randomly established roadblocks 
or tax evasion is discovered primarily by randomly auditing 
citizens' tax returns. There are a number of cases where the 
probability of wrongful harassment is close to or greater 
than the probability of punishment for members of certain 
groups-when profiles, based on physical or physiological 
traits related to race and ethnicity, are employed by law en-
forcement officials to make stops and to detain individuals. 
6. Although each of g,J, and c is here viewed as a single 
value. each is more accurately viewed as the moment of a 
probability distribution. For example, a prospective crimi-
nal does not know the exact value to be gained from a 
crime. such as the exact amount of money that can be stolen 
from a bank. As a moment, the gain g is the expected value 
of a random variable with possible values g 1• g: . .. . ,g" each 
with probabilities P(g 1), P(g~) • ... , P(g"). Then g = 
L ;g;P(g;) = g1P(g1) + 82P(g~) + · · · + gnP(gn)-
Similarly. f and c are moments with f = '5..j;F(f,) and c = 
L;c;P(c). The treatment of g, f. and c as moments does not 
markedly detract from the generality of the analysis because g ,J, 
and c can be considered as independent random variables, and. 
therefore, the lotteries (i.e., the full expansion of the terms) can 
be replaced with the moments (Luce and Raiffa, 1967:23-31). 
The payoff table for the general case where g, J, and c 
can take on various values is shown in Table 2. In Table 2. 
The expected utilities are then 
EU(crime) = "I.iP(gi)U(gi)+Il-/(g;-Ji)U(gi-fj) 
and 
EU(nocrime) = P(O)U(O)--'f.iP(-c)U(-c). 
7. An interesting limiting case. raised by a reviewer, 
arises when the harassment payoff. -c, approaches the loss 
from crime, g - f Considering just the payoffs, if g - f = 
-c. then committing the crime dominates not committing 
the crime. This is so because the payoffs to both acts are 
equal given that the individual is punished and the payoff to 
the former is greater than that to the latter, given that the in-
dividual is not punished. The probabilities, p and q, how-
ever, are not equal, and. therefore. simple dominance in 
payoffs does not resolve the problem. If g - f = -c, then 
the deterrence measure. D. becomes 
D = [qU(-c)+(l-q)U(Ol]-[pU(-c)+(l-p)U(g)] 
so that 
D = (q-p)U(-c)-(l-p1l.·(g). 
Because U(-c) < 0 and U<gi > 0. if pis close to unity. so 
that (I - p)U(g) is close to zero. then D is positive and de-
terrence is maintained. If. howeYer. q is close to p. so that 
(q - p)U(-c) is close to zero. then Dis negative and deter-
rence is lost. Thus, if g - f = -c. then deterrence is main-
tained only if p is large absolureiy and relative to q. 
TABLE 2 
PAYOFF TABLE FOR THE GENERAL CASE OF THE CRIME DECISION PRCBL!:M 
Payoff 
If Crime Is 
Committed 
Punished or harassed g, - t, 
g, - f2 
9, - fn 
92 - t, 
92 - f2 
92 - fn 
9m - f, 
9m - f2 
9m - fn 
Not punished or not harassed g, 
92 
QK 
Probability of 
Punishment 
P(9, - t,) 
P(9, - f2) 
P(9, - fn) 
P(92 - f,) 
P(92 - f2) 
P(92 - fn) 
P(9m - f,) 
P(9m - f2) 
P(9m - fn) 
P(g,) 
P(g2) 
P(9K) 
Payoff 
If Crime Is 
Not Committed 
-c. 
-Cz 
-c. 
0 
Probability of 
Harassment 
P(-c1) 
P(-c2) 
P(-c1) 
P(O) 
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8. Becker writes as follows:
It is easily shown that an increase in pi would reduce
the expected utility [of committing the crime], and thus 
the number of offenses, more than an equal percentage 
increase in fj if [individual j] has a preference for risk; 
the increase infj would have the greater effect if he has 
a\·ersion to risk: and they would have the same effect if 
he is risk neutral. The widespread generalization that of­
fenders are more deterred by the probability of convic­
tion than by the punishment when convicted turns out to 
imply in the expected-utility approach that offenders are 
risk preferrers. at least in the relevant region of punish­
ments. (Becker. 1968: 178) 
Becker recently reiterated this \'iew: 
I believe that criminals actually like risk-they're 
risk takers. not avoiders. What supports this belief? The 
economic approach implies that. for a risk taker engaged 
in crime. the certainty of punishment is more important 
than the magnitude of the punishment when or if you are 
convicted. (Becker, 1995: I 1) 
The comparison of equal percentage changes in p and f
in the model employed here produces somewhat more so­
phisticated results. It is easy to show that an increase in pre­
duces the expected utility of crime by more than an equal 
percentage change inf only if the rnlue off is already rea­
sonably high. More specifically. for an individual with the 
S-shaped utility function facing the crime decision problem
with c = 0. an increase in p has a greater deterrent effect
than an equal percentage change inf only iff > ft where ft is 
determined by the equation 
U( 0)-U(o-f) 
U'(g-f1) = 0 f ., . I . l 
, Geometrically. this equation states that J; is determined so 
that the chord from the point [g.U(g)] to the point [g -
/. Uc g - fi)] is tangent to the utility function at [g - fi,U(g -
/ 1). l The widespread generalization that increasing p has a 
greater deterrent effect than increasing f implies in the ex­
pected utility approach, extended and refined via the S-shaped 
utility function. that most potential offenders face crime de­
cision problems where the le\'el of punishment is already 
high (i.e., probiems wheref > J;J. 
9. Yu and Liska (1993) pro\'ide a sample (from 26 U.S.
cities) that suggests that this perception by African Ameri­
cans is, for assaults and rapes. well supported. They note 
that ·'blacks contribute 76'ic of the robbery arrests and 76% 
of the robberies; 65% of the assault arrests and 50% of the 
assaults; and 73% of the rape arrests and 55% of the rapes" 
! Yu and Liska, 1993:455-6. footnote 9). Hagedorn and Ma­
con (1988) and Jankowski (1991) report anecdotal evidence
that minority individuals in gangs perceive themselves to be
harassed by the police.
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